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Monarchical rule is said to have become anachronistic in a modern age of 
legal rational orders and representative institutions. And yet, despite 
successive waves of democratization having usurped their authority across 
much of the globe, a select few monarchs remain defiant, especially in small 
states. This stubborn persistence raises questions about the application of 
Huntington’s “King’s Dilemma” in which modern monarchs are apparently 
trapped in a historical cycle that will ultimately strip them of meaningful 
power. Drawing on in-depth historical research in three small states that have 
sought to combine democratic and monarchical rule – Tonga, Bhutan and 
Liechtenstein – we argue that, contra Huntington, monarchs in small states are 
neither doomed to disappear nor are they likely to be overwhelmed by the 
dilemma posed by modernist development. The lesson is that the size of 
political units is a critical variable too often overlooked in existing studies. 
 
Modern monarchs, Samuel Huntington famously argued, face a fundamental 
dilemma.1 On the one hand, to promote social, cultural and economic development 
monarchs must centralise power. On the other hand, such reforms create a new cadre 
of elites whose political participation threatens to undermine their authority. By 
delaying modernist reform in favour of traditionalism the monarch can retain 
authority. But, stymieing progress increases the risk of popular revolt. As a result, 
Huntington argues, a peaceful transition from absolute monarchy to an electoral 
regime is virtually impossible. The modern monarch is caught in a perpetual trap that 
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they cannot ever hope to escape and as a result modernists must eventually strip them 
of all meaningful authority. In the ensuing half a century since Huntington outlined 
this prediction numerous cases would appear to bear his argument out. Most recently, 
the “Third Wave” is said to have all but brought an end to absolute monarchy as a 
modern political regime.2 Instead, democratic constitutions have usurped their power, 
either dismantling royal households altogether or limiting their influence to the 
performance of rituals, ceremonies and traditions.  
Huntington’s analysis remains one of the most sustained attempts to theorise 
both the rise of democratic regimes in the 20th Century and the demise of monarchy 
as a credible alternative. Where other scholars have tended to focus on the way 
industrialisation and economic growth in particular underpin social conditions that 
pave the way for democratic rule,3 Huntington focused on the means by which 
different regimes derive their legitimacy, thus underscoring the continued relevance 
of his work. The problem with his script, however, is that it struggles to explain the 
last remaining monarchies that have seemingly defied successive rolling waves of 
democratization to retain a level of authority and influence in modern politics. There 
are approximately twenty absolute or semi-absolute monarchical regimes in the world 
today, most of them located on the Arabian Peninsula. Interestingly however, many of 
these last monarchies are among the world’s smallest states (defined here as those 
countries with populations of less than 1.5 million). This is remarkable for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that small states are, on average, much more likely to be 
democratic than large ones,4 but also because the size and relative power of small 
states should, in theory, make them especially receptive to democratization via 
demonstration effects.5 The stubborn persistence of modern monarchs in small states 
raises questions about the application of Huntington’s “King’s Dilemma”, at least in 
these cases.  
In this article we ask how monarchs in three small states – Tonga, Bhutan and 
Liechtenstein – have managed to either negotiate or sidestep Huntington’s “King’s 
Dilemma”. By tracing how modern monarchs have involved themselves in the 
process of democratization we show that, contra Huntington, they are neither doomed 
to disappear nor are they likely to be overwhelmed by the dilemma posed by 
modernist development. We argue that the ability of monarchs in small states to retain 
legitimacy6 despite democratic reform can be explained by their size, which has two 
distinct effects: institutional fidelity and personalisation.  
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Institutional fidelity refers to the relative absence of revolution and propensity 
of small states to retain key features of political systems even amidst periods of 
considerable political change. In this important sense, small states are inherently 
conservative, albeit in a very different form to the ideologically conservative manner 
common to right wing parties in large states. The literature advances two explanations 
for this: 1) their inherent vulnerability in an international system made up of many 
more larger states means small states are typically unwilling to risk instability; and 2) 
reduced social distance (colloquially: “everybody knows everybody”) works against 
pluralism and public dissent. 7  
These same factors also result in power being more likely to be concentrated 
in the hands of individuals rather than legal rational institutions in small states. Based 
on this observation, we define personalisation as the tendency for politics to focus on 
personal characteristics and relations rather than abstract ideologies, policies, or 
political programs.8  For example, it is common for public figures in small states to 
play multiple social roles – political, economic, religious etc. – that are typically 
separate or specialised in larger states.9  
The combination of institutional fidelity and personalisation means that 
monarchs in small states are often very popular – they are not remote or distant 
figures – which makes it easier for them to retain personal authority. And, they can 
also be relatively confident that the majority of their subjects will not seek to advance 
a more radical political agenda than their own. This can help us explain how 
monarchs have managed to either negotiate or sidestep the King’s Dilemma in our 
three cases: rather than competing forms of legitimacy small state monarchs have 
managed to portray themselves as both the custodian of tradition and the harbinger of 
modernization. The result is that small state monarchies can be remarkably durable. 
To support this assertion the article is divided into the following sections. 
First, we flesh out our argument about the way state size shapes the transition from 
monarchy to democracy, and vice versa. We then outline our case selection and 
methodological approach. Thirdly, drawing on the public record and our own 
fieldwork in each of the three selected small monarchies, we provide in-depth 
qualitative case studies of the processes by which recent political changes have 
occurred in these countries. In Tonga the late King Tupou V’s decision to cede power 
to the legislative assembly ushered in a new era of democratic rule. Likewise, in 
Bhutan, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck promoted democratic reform in the face of 
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societal opposition. Conversely, in Liechtenstein Prince Hans-Adam II has increased 
his power relative to democratic institutions on the back of popular disenchantment 
with elected representatives. We show that in each case the ability of the monarch to 
either promote or stymie democratisation is strongly related to the small size of our 
three cases. In the final section we return to the theoretical significance of this piece 
and its implications for how we understand the influence of state size on democratic 
transition and consolidation. 
 
Monarchy, democratic transitions, and state size 
Since at least the 1950-60s when decolonization led to the emergence of many new 
nation-states in Africa and Asia, democracy promotion efforts have focused on the 
necessary and sufficient conditions that brought these changes about. By and large we 
think that democracy is more likely to occur when countries are wealthy, socially 
homogenous, operate consociational institutions, have stable party systems, and are 
located near other democracies.10 In turn, creating these conditions has become key to 
democracy promotion efforts around the world.  
The problem with these common theories of democratization is that they fail 
the most basic empirical tests because small states have been systematically excluded 
from most analyses.11 Small states around the world are statistically more likely to 
have democratic governments than large ones, irrespective of the presence or absence 
of the above variables.12 At the same time, as we discussed above, small states are 
also more likely to be monarchies, and various combinations of democracy and 
monarchy can be seen across this group of cases. 12 out of the 40 smallest states in 
the world (24 per cent) are monarchies, and while six of these are classified as ‘free’ 
by Freedom House, two are categorised as ‘partially free’, and four as ‘not free’. 
Indeed, we might think of monarchs in small states as existing on a continuum with 
ceremonial monarchs (e.g. Luxembourg and Lesotho) at one end and absolute 
monarchies (e.g. Bahrain, Brunei, and Swaziland) on the other. To examine how 
monarchs in small states deal with Huntington’s “King’s Dilemma”, in this article we 
zoom in on three members of the intermediate group of semi-constitutional 
monarchies: Tonga, Bhutan and Liechtenstein. 13  We define semi-constitutional 
monarchies as systems in which the actions of monarchs are circumscribed by a 
constitution, but in which monarchs, as independent and autonomous political actors, 
nonetheless have the capacity to exert a large measure of political influence. 
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Drawing on the existing literature on small state democracy, we argue that there 
are two primary reasons for the persistence of monarchy – institutional fidelity and 
personalization – in these settings. The “pragmatic conservatism” of small states has 
long been a feature of the scholarship on their politics. Paul Sutton, for instance, 
argues that: 
 
“Those who live in small states cling tenaciously to familiar patterns of life. 
Their settled conservatism stems from a caution born of long experience with 
resources whose exploitation is severely limited by scale, by isolation, and by 
physical and economic hazards beyond their control. These constraints incline 
residents toward the maintenance of continuity, the practice of conservation, 
and the hedging of bets by taking on multiple occupations. (…) The persistence 
of monarchy and/or a special role for chiefs within their political systems is one 
expression of this fact, as is the limited role women play in political life as 
traditionally conceived”.14 
 
In relation to monarchy, the inherent institutional fidelity (or ‘conservatism’) of 
small states can in part be attributed to their symbolic relationship with the very 
existence of the sovereign state. Historically, many small states would not exist but 
for the interventions of their monarchs, as monarchical families often played a key 
role in the birth of these political entities. This is the case for European microstates 
like Monaco and Liechtenstein, but also for the Gulf states, the southern African 
monarchies, and Bhutan, Brunei, and Tonga, where European colonizers recognized 
and to varying extents respected the pre-existing monarchical arrangements. More 
than in larger states, in which identities can be constructed on the basis of a greater 
variety of sources and objects, small state monarchies often become synonymous with 
the state itself.  
The tendency to consider the monarchy an essential component of the identity 
of the state may further increase when the monarch also vocally defends national or 
traditional values of the country (s)he reigns, and in this sense represents a 
conservative political force. Small states are inherently vulnerable in the international 
system. 15  If, under such circumstances, monarchs fulfill the role of national 
protectors, citizens may come to believe that the international survival of their state is 
inextricably linked to the monarchy. In turn, such perceptions enhance the legitimacy 
6 
 
and political position of monarchs among the small state population. The centrality of 
the monarch to the life of the nation in small states can also explain why they are able 
to achieve the delicate balance that Huntington believes is impossible between being 
the custodian of social traditions on the one hand and the harbinger of modernization 
and development on the other. To explain this link, however, we also need to 
acknowledge a second prevailing feature of small state politics: the ubiquity of 
personalization.  
By virtue of their size, all politics, including both monarchy and democracy, in 
small states is defined by the reduced social proximity between the ruler and the 
ruled. Monarchs are rarely remote and distant figures in small states in the way they 
came to be perceived by revolutionary and republican movements in larger countries. 
In which case, contra Huntington, in small states they are able to both devolve 
authority and remaining personally popular. That is, the person often appears more 
popular than the institution they represent. Indeed, as we will show, monarchs in these 
contexts have been able to successfully entrench their authority while also initiating 
democratization. The effect of this is that, again, contra Huntington, the transition 
from monarchy to democracy can be relatively peaceful when initiated by a popular 
sovereign.  
 
Case selection and approach 
To investigate Huntington’s argument against our own we examine the process of 
recent political change in three hitherto understudied cases: Tonga, Bhutan and 
Liechtenstein. More than half of the world’s last remaining absolute and semi-
absolute monarchies are small states with less than 1.5 million inhabitants. But, small 
states are also much more likely than large ones to have stable and long lasting 
democratic regimes.16 This somewhat paradoxical combination makes them ideal 
cases for comparative analysis. In this article we look at three small states that have 
sought to combine democratic and monarchical elements, and which to varying 
degrees have experienced changes in the balance of power between the two. 
Huntington offers three possible strategies for monarchs seeking to escape the King’s 
Dilemma: 1) promote movement towards modernisation; 2) combine monarchical rule 
and popular authority, 3) retain power by any means. We choose three cases that 




Our case selection is significant because it allows us to control for the full range of 
necessary and sufficient preconditions that democratization scholars commonly 
identify.17 All three countries have largely avoided colonisation, thus bracketing 
historical sociological explanations that emphasise the importance of colonial heritage 
as causing institutional fidelity, and have not been part of separatist or breakaway 
movements.18 In this sense they are outliers in the extant “Third Wave” debates. They 
also come from different regions of the world and have varying degrees of economic 
wealth, thus controlling for the main assumptions in the extant modernisation 
literature. In addition, our “most different” case selection19 enables us to more clearly 
identify the effects of smallness in each of the three cases. Civil society organisations 
and popular movements have played some role but, given their small size, the strength 
and capacity of such actors remains an ongoing concern for democracy promoters. In 
turn, as individual scholars of each of these countries have observed,20 voluntarist 
theories of democratization tend to have more empirical purchase. 
Having controlled for factors that democratization scholars identify as causing 
and sustaining transition, we then look within each case to identify how political 
transition occurred. Analytically, we combine original empirical material, including 
in-depth interviews with key political elites in all three countries, with secondary 
literature. The result is a series of historically orientated case studies that follow 
Cameron Thies’ guidelines for qualitative historical analysis involving ‘thick 
description’.21  After providing a brief overview of the political histories and basic 
facts (i.e. descriptive statistics) of our three cases, we discuss how the motivations, 
perspectives, and actions of three monarchs have influenced the trajectories of each 
regime. This comparative analysis allows us to identify commonalities and 
differences between our three cases, and to determine how the smallness of each 
country influenced political developments in recent decades. 
 
Tonga’s path to democracy 
The story of modern Tonga, an island nation with a population of just over 100,000 in 
the South Pacific, is often said to begin in 1875 with the promulgation of a written 
constitution establishing the monarchy and a landed gentry alongside certain 
Westminster-style institutions, including a legislature, judiciary, prime minister and 
cabinet. The rationale for the 1875 constitution was twofold: it allowed Tonga to look 
sufficiently like a modern state to avoid being colonised by larger powers, while also 
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enabling the then King Tupou I to consolidate and centralise authority.22 In the 
ensuing century the centralisation of authority enabled successive monarchs to retain 
a degree of sovereignty and pursue modernist-orientated reforms with considerable 
initial success. But, in the latter half of the 20th century, amidst a succession of costly 
government blunders and stalling economic progress, political agitation in the form of 
a pro-democracy movement gathered momentum. Popular disenchantment with the 
way power was being exercised placed considerable pressure on the government to 
pursue meaningful political reform. But, while the aging King Tupou IV held the 
throne these efforts were ignored or blocked.23 After his death in 2006, the new King, 
Tupou V, initiated a reform process that resulted in democratically orientated 
constitutional amendments. Based on this brief summary, of our three cases the 
Tongan story appears to conform closest to Huntington’s script. And yet, the 
continued authority of the monarch in Tongan society and the popularity of the King 
undermines Huntington’s central claim. 
The reason for this disjuncture becomes apparent when we probe deeper into 
the micro politics of more than a century of political reform. Christianity, not 
economic development, was central to the consolidation of power in late 19th century 
and early 20th century Tonga. Wesleyan missionaries were an important influence on 
the 1875 constitution-making process while the Church organisation provided Queen 
Salote, who ruled the islands from 1918 to 1965, with the means to further establish 
her authority. By and large, Salote eschewed economic modernisation with the 
important exception of her children who were educated overseas. This would prove 
crucial as her son and successor, Tupou IV, the first Tongan to gain a university 
degree, would ascend to the throne in 1965 with a modernist development agenda. 
Under the 1875 constitution the monarch is both head of state and head of 
government with the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet. Backed by the legal legitimacy but also unprecedented customary authority, 
Tupou IV oversaw investment in infrastructure and education in particular, but most 
importantly sought to open Tonga up to the influence of the outside world: 
 
We [Privy Council] met every week, once a week, and so in that sense we 
would understand where he was coming from, what his thoughts were, and 
wanted us to focus on. We would provide him with reports ... [He was] very 
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hands on. It was not just a matter or reigning, he actually ruled. And so that is 
how the relationship was.24 
  
And, by and large, the initial results were impressive with the country held up as a 
regional model of growth and progress throughout the 1970s.25 Echoing the inherent 
“King’s Dilemma”, however, to achieve these gains Tupou IV required an educated 
and technically competent elite. Many of these were drawn from the nobility but the 
new openness also provided scope for commoners to gain access to education, usually 
overseas and at the University of the South Pacific (USP) in Suva, Fiji, in particular. 
It was here, in the 1970s, that Tonga’s pro-democracy movement emerged. 
The extent to which the movement was ever unified or centrally organised 
remains contentious.26 The common thread is the presence of undisputed figurehead, 
schoolteacher turned politician, Akilisi Pohiva. Pohiva attended USP in the 1970s and 
was later dismissed from the civil service for critical radio broadcasts. He 
subsequently won a landmark legal case against the government for unfair dismissal 
and denial of freedom of speech. In the interim he obtained a seat in Tonga’s 
legislative assembly. From 1981 the assembly had 18 members: 9 drawn from the 30 
noble titleholders and 9 “people’s representatives” elected by popular vote from the 
population at large.27 But, it had little meaningful power. Typically the Prime Minister 
was a close relative of the King and most of the ministers were nobles. Laws were 
initiated by the Cabinet and passed by the Assembly, which comprised of the Cabinet, 
the 9 nobles and the 9 peoples representatives. Bills required the King’s assent before 
becoming law and the people’s representatives had no prospect of forming 
government. But, membership of the assembly did provide Pohiva and his allies with 
a platform from which to criticise the way the country was run.  
The pro-democracy movement’s initial concerns were corruption and 
accountability but over time their platform broadened to include Tonga’s system of 
entrenched privilege that ensured vast inequalities in the distribution of land and 
resources. Activism proceeded on numerous fronts, including in the assembly but also 
among an emerging civil society and the Atenisi Institute in particular.28 After 
Pohiva’s radio broadcasts were halted in 1985, a monthly newspaper, Kele’a, became 
the main platform for the dissemination of democratic ideas.29 Later, Kalafi Moala’s 
Taimi O Tonga became another important outlet for critical commentary.30 Further 
support and resources came in the form of remittances from the growing Tongan 
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diaspora living in Australia and New Zealand. But, while the financial support was 
important, the simultaneous “brain drain” meant that many of the most capable and 
politically aware Tongans had left, thus easing political pressure.31 Key figures in the 
church also came to support the pro-democracy cause.  
King Tupou IV and his government responded using all of the strategies that 
Huntington outlines, including attempts to co-opt progressive elites, repression, 
prosecution and intimidation.32 Pohiva and others spent time in prison as a result of 
their political actions. Appeals to culture, tradition and former glory of the Tongan 
people formed the other strand of the ruling class’s response.33 And so, as long as 
Tupou IV remained in power, increasingly vocal calls for reform fell on deaf ears.34 
From 2004, with Tupou IV clearly ailing, the crown prince and his sister oversaw 
several progressive changes, including the establishment of a political reform 
committee.35 While some welcomed these moves as positive steps, the scale and 
vocality of civil service strikes in 2005 further emboldened reformist claims that they 
did not go far enough.  
Tupou IV died in September 2006 and was succeeded by his son, Tupou V. 
By 2010 the constitution was amended to provide that the ‘Form of Government’ is 
now a ‘Constitutional Monarchy’ (rather than ‘Constitutional Government’) in which: 
 
The executive authority of the Kingdom small vest in Cabinet, which shall be 
collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly for the executive 
functions of Government.36  
 
The makeup of the Assembly was also altered with 17 people’s representatives now 
sitting alongside the 9 nobles in a 26 member legislature (the constitution also permits 
the Prime Minister to choose up to four additional ministers from outside the house). 
The Monarch still retains considerable powers, including the ability to veto bills and 
appoint the judiciary but Tupou V’s successor, Tupou VI, plays no role in Cabinet 
decision-making. And, symbolic of the magnitude of these changes, in the 2014 
elections Pohiva was elected Prime Minister. 
In relation to Huntington, the Tongan case is remarkable for several reasons, 
including most obviously the absence of modernist industrial development (Tonga’s 
GNI per capita hovers just above the US $5,000 mark) and the role of religious 
institutions in particular, but also because it was marked by a transition of power that 
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followed with the terms of the nation’s constitution.37 That is not to understate the 
significance of the 2006 riots in which eight people were killed and considerable 
property destroyed. But, for now, 135 years after the 1875 constitution was first 
established, a new balance appears to have reached in which respect for Tongan 
traditions and the authority of the monarch is preserved – and even enhanced – 
alongside democratic norms and practices. Indeed, it is important to note that the aim 
of mainstream reformers was not to abolish the monarchy but to reform it from within 
and thus retain its centrality in the life of the nation. For the most part this settlement 
reflects the intentional decisions and actions (or non-decisions and non-actions) of 
key figures, including King Tupou IV and King Tupou V and Pohiva in particular.  
 
Bhutan’s transition to democracy  
Bhutan, a small country with a population of 730,000 with a GDP per capita just over 
US $2000, is located in the South Asian subcontinent. The closest Bhutan came to 
colonisation was when it lost some parts of its fertile southern Duars to the British in 
the Anglo-Bhutan war of 1864-65. Otherwise, unlike most of its neighbours in South 
Asia, Bhutan was never subject to colonial rule. In 2008 Bhutan held its first 
democratic elections. What makes this case especially interesting is that unlike Tonga, 
in Bhutan the King initiated reform in the face of significant popular opposition. And 
yet, despite the majority of Bhutanese preferring monarchy over democracy, the 
transition was peaceful with most observers arguing that it was a qualified success. 
The European Union Election Observation Mission, for example, stated that ‘24 
March [2008] marks a successful and orderly change of political system in Bhutan 
from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy’; and that an 80 per cent 
voter turnout and the commitment of state institutions to support the democratic 
process provides a solid foundation for a credible democratic future.38   
The unique nature of this transition has generated considerable debate among 
academics. Here we focus on two areas of disagreement – the absence of popular 
protest and the motivations of the monarch – to flesh out our argument. As above, the 
overwhelming interpretation of Bhutan’s transition is that it took place in the absence 
of popular movement for democracy, with Bhutan’s monarchs the leading force for 
change.39 In this common explanation there was no economic crisis nor was there any 
pressure from the international community.40 The transition was ‘peaceful, calm and 
unflinching’41; and was initiated by the King rather than a ‘revolutionary movement 
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or a national catastrophe’.42 This ‘radical step’, involving the voluntary reallocation of 
power was introduced in the ‘face of remarkable indifference towards democracy by 
the people’.43  
This indifference or even suspicion of democracy among Bhutanese is often 
attributed to demonstration effects with the ‘messy’ experience of neighbouring 
countries such as Nepal and India, where unrest, divisiveness and partisan politics are 
common, worrying the Bhutanese people and the urban population in particular.44 In 
public consultations individuals expressed concern that the ‘Constitution and 
democracy were coming too early to Bhutan, and that the interests of the people 
would be forgotten if the monarchy was to devolve power to the political parties’.45 
The King responded: 
 
Bhutan, through good fortune and fate, could not hope for a better moment 
than now for this historical development and would never find another 
opportunity like this to introduce a Constitution that would provide a 
democratic system of government best suited for the future well-being of the 
nation … In many countries, constitutions are drafted during times, under 
pressure from political influences and interest, but Bhutan is fortunate that the 
change came without any pressure or compulsion.46 
 
Obviously, the absence of societal opposition supports our thesis so it is 
important that we examine the credibility of the alternative explanation. The argument 
against the prevailing view is that it fails to take into account the pressure applied on 
the regime by the ‘approximately 100,000 refugees, who criticise the absence of 
democracy from outside the country’.47 These refugees, who claimed Bhutanese 
citizenship as a part of Southern Bhutan, agitated for increased influence, rights to 
citizenship and cultural and civil rights in the late 1980s. Two counter arguments are 
important here. The first is that even if the population of Southern Bhutan was more 
pro-democratic than the rest of the country they still constitute a considerable 
minority. More importantly, however, this argument overlooks the timing and 
sequence of decisions. The refugee issue was close to being resolved at the time the 
political reforms were initiated. A five-member core group under the leadership of the 
United States of America and comprising of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Netherlands and Norway was formed in September 2006 in New York. These 
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governments agreed to resettle the Southern Bhutanese refugees in their countries. 
That is not to say that these events did not play into the King’s thinking, but it is hard 
to make a plausible case that his was not the decisive hand. 
If we follow the prevailing view that the King was the key architect of this 
transition, the important point, in relation to Huntington, was his motivation. In 
Huntington’s thesis, the Monarch only cedes power to democratic institutions if they 
think it will help them retain power. However, while this will help in the long term, in 
time, Huntington argues, democratic institutions will ultimately undermine 
monarchical authority. It is too early to test this argument in the Bhutan case – but see 
the below discussion of Liechtenstein – and so for now we will focus on the first point 
about the King’s initial motivation.   
The process of democratization started in 1953 when the Third King, Jigme 
Dorji Wangchuck (r.1952-1972) created an independent parliament comprising of a 
mix of representatives from the government and the public. The Fourth King, Jigme 
Singye Wangchuck (r.1972-2006), continued the democratic reform process with the 
creation of Dzongkhag Yargye Tshogdus (DYT) or the District Development 
Committee in every dzongkhag (administrative unit) in 1981 and the subsequent 
establishment of Gewog Yargye Tshogchung (GYT) or the Block Development 
Committee in every gewog (sub-administrative unit) in 1991. The DYTs and GYTs 
sought to involve the people in decision-making processes through local government 
elections. The Fourth King’s second key decision involved the devolution of his 
executive powers to a Council of Ministers elected by Bhutan’s parliament in 1998. 
Finally, these political changes culminated in the drafting of the Constitution in 2001, 
followed by the first democratic parliamentary elections held in 2008.  
This sequence is said to support the prevailing view that Bhutan’s democratic 
transition was a ‘gift’ of the King to the people.48 In this interpretation, the King is a 
benevolent monarch who acted against his own interests by ceding power. 49 
According to Gallenkamp, the transition to democracy in Bhutan was pursued by the 
King with an ‘honest commitment to the wellbeing of the people and the nation’.50 
Kaul also adds that Bhutan’s democracy is a ‘gift’ from the monarch who despite 
considerable personal authority with widespread support voluntarily gave up his 
powers.51 
 The alternate interpretation is that the King’s decision to adopt the 
Constitution ‘voluntarily’ was crucially influenced by its closest neighbour, India.52 
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To support this view, Hutt and Bothe allude to an increase in India’s aid to Bhutan by 
50 per cent at the same time that democratic reforms were initiated.53 While the 
timing of these events is indeed important, the causal relationship is less certain. The 
increase in aid also came about just after Operation All Clear – a military operation 
initiated by the Royal Bhutan Army under the direct command of the Fourth King of 
Bhutan in 2003 against groups of Indian militants taking temporary shelter in the 
Southern foothills of Bhutan. The operation earned the ‘admiration of the government 
of India’ towards Bhutan, and a strengthening of the bilateral relations between the 
two countries, which in turn beget increased assistance from India.54 Putting aside the 
importance of aid, however, Bothe further argues that in Bhutan the process of 
‘constitutionalization … tends to reposition the monarchy in a concrete, dignified and 
elevated position of power’.55 This argument falls in line with Huntington’s view that 
modern monarch’s only initiate democracy when it serves their interests.  
The whole question of motivations is inherently complex, however, and so we 
cannot and do not dismiss this argument. Rather, in relation to Huntington, the 
important point is that regardless of intent, the increased authority of the monarch has 
indeed been the effect of democratic reforms. Sinpeng, for example, argues that in 
Bhutan the ‘monarchy is here to stay’.56 Indeed, the irony is that by construing 
democracy as a ‘gift’ and affirming the contingent nature of monarchical power, the 
King simultaneously devolved authority and cemented the monarchy’s place in 
Bhutanese socio-political life. In doing so he ensured a peaceful transition to 
democracy and sidestepped Huntington’s King’s Dilemma, at least for a time. 
 
Gott, Fürst, und Vaterland1: the Principality of Liechtenstein 
Sandwiched between Austria and Switzerland, the Principality of Liechtenstein is an 
Alpine micro-monarchy with approximately 37.000 inhabitants and a territory of 160 
square kilometers. According to figures of various international organizations, 
Liechtenstein has the highest GDP per capita figure in Europe, and possibly in the 
world (together with Qatar). The territory of contemporary Liechtenstein was 
purchased in 1699 and 1712 by the Austrian aristocratic family Von und Zu 
Liechtenstein. In ensuing centuries successive generations of this family ruled the 
territory from Vienna. After the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, 
                                                
1 In English: “God, Prince, and Fatherland.” 
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Liechtenstein became one of the 39 members of the German Confederation, a loose 
economic association of German-speaking territories. When this Confederation was 
terminated, and the newly created German and Austro-Hungarian Empires emerged, 
Liechtenstein effectively became a self-governing territory. 57  In 1921 a new 
constitution established a so-called “dualistic” system whereby both the Prince and 
the people rule (it had previously been an absolute monarchy).58 The ensuing political 
system has been characterized as a constitutional monarchy, but in fact the role played 
by the Landesfürst or Prince is much greater than that of monarchs in other European 
constitutional monarchies. As a result, it makes more sense to categorize 
Liechtenstein as a semi-constitutional monarchy, which is comparable to Jordan, 
Morocco, and Thailand. 
In strictly formal terms, the position of the Prince in the political system of 
Liechtenstein is not that different from the position of the British monarch in the 
political system of the United Kingdom. However, as David Beattie underscores, a 
key difference is that in contrast to monarchs in larger European monarchies, the 
Princes of Liechtenstein actually make use of their prerogatives.59 On paper, the 
monarchy in Liechtenstein can veto laws and dismiss the government and parliament, 
and while these rights have not often been invoked, successive Princes of 
Liechtenstein have occasionally made use of these powers, or have threatened to do 
so. Alongside this tradition of monarchical intervention, Liechtenstein has a long 
history of direct democracy, but while the number of direct democracy instruments in 
the microstate is more extensive even than neighboring Switzerland, in practice it is 
much less frequently applied.60  
The case of Liechtenstein provides a clear demonstration that personal 
leadership matters in small states. The contemporary hereditary Prince – Hans Adam 
II – is widely regarded as having a much more confrontational and controversial 
ruling style than his predecessors,61 and since his inauguration in 1989 there have 
been a number of severe conflicts between the Prince and democratically elected 
politicians. In 1992, a conflict about Liechtenstein’s accession to the European 
Economic Area (EEA) sparked a 10-year constitutional crisis that centered on the 
position of the Prince in Liechtenstein politics. Arguing that the monarchy had played 
a crucial role in the establishment and survival of Liechtenstein, the Prince made it 
clear that he would not accept limitation of his powers, and even threatened to leave 
the country if his proposals for constitutional reform were not accepted.62 While 
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political parties were internally divided about the issue, during a referendum in 2003, 
65 per cent percent of voters endorsed the constitutional proposals of the Prince, 
which are broadly seen to have augmented his powers.63 The European Council and 
other international actors voiced their criticism of the reforms, which were considered 
to weaken Liechtenstein’s democracy. 
According to Prince Hans-Adam II, the constitutional reforms of 2003 have 
actually provided for a democratic legitimation of the monarchy in Liechtenstein, 
because they entail a regulation that provides for the abolishment of the monarchy.64 
According to the new constitution, if a majority of citizens votes for the abolition of 
the monarchy during a popular referendum, the monarchy will be dismissed.65 On the 
other hand, the reforms have increased the influence of the Prince on the appointment 
of judges, and have reconfirmed and possibly extended his authority to veto decisions 
of parliament and results of popular referendums.66 The consequences of the latter 
regulation became profoundly clear in the wake of a popular referendum on the 
abortion law in 2012, when the hereditary Prince already in advance to the vote 
announced that he would veto a law allowing for abortions, effectively rendering the 
referendum meaningless. According to critics of the monarchy, such as 
Liechtenstein’s democracy movement, the 2003 reforms have distorted the 
constitutional dualism between Prince and people, because the Prince has increased 
his influence vis-à-vis all three branches of government (i.e. government, parliament, 
and the courts) and can veto outcomes of referendums and other plebiscites.67 
According to Wilfried Marxer, the 2003 reforms have actually eroded the authority of 
representative institutions.68 
The dynamics of Liechtenstein politics in the last two decades, and the 
enduring discussion about the role of the monarchy, are clearly also influenced by the 
smallness of the country.69 Apart from the observation that traditional forms of 
leadership such as monarchy are more common in smaller settings,70 it is also clear 
that small societies frequently have a ‘dominant cultural code’71 to which all members 
of society are expected to subscribe, while those who express dissenting opinions tend 
to face social exclusion and ostracism.72 As the results of recently held referendums 
demonstrate, in Liechtenstein approximately two thirds of the population is highly 
supportive of the Prince, and considers the monarchy to be an essential part of the 
Liechtenstein identity. According to some observers, by threatening to withdraw to 
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Vienna and by referring to his critics as “enemies”, the current Prince strongly 
appeals to these emotional sentiments of the Liechtenstein population.73     
In defending the position of the monarchy in Liechtenstein, Prince Hans-
Adam II has also frequently appealed to the lack of trust in elected politicians and 
political institutions. Referring to the parliament and government as ‘the oligarchy’,74 
the Prince cautions that the monarchy and the people must be protected against 
elected politicians, who not only tend to be corrupt, but will also permanently seek to 
maximize their influence. By identifying the political elite as the common enemy of 
both the monarchy and the people, the Prince essentially employs populist tactics to 
bolster his own position vis-à-vis the Landtag (parliament) and Regierung 
(government). As in other constitutional monarchies, survey data tends to reveal that 
people in Liechtenstein have more trust in the monarchy than in elected politicians,75 
and these sentiments are successfully exploited by the reigning Prince. According to 
critics, veiled attacks against politicians have resulted in self-censorship among the 
members of government and parliament, who are electorally dependent on 
maintaining a positive view of the Prince and face a Princely veto should they attempt 
to curb his authority.  
In addition to denouncing elected politicians, the Prince of Liechtenstein also 
repeatedly appeals to nationalist sentiments by citing external threats to the 
Principality. The Council of Europe’s opposition to the constitutional reforms of 2003 
was condemned by the Prince as an external attempt to interfere with the sovereignty 
and self-determination rights of the Liechtenstein people.76 The global financial and 
economic crisis of 2008 generated strong international pressure on Liechtenstein to 
end its tax haven status and reform its banking system. In response, the Prince talked 
about his ‘powerful enemies in the north’ and expressed his confidence that the 
country would survive the ‘fourth Reich’ (a reference to the German government).77 
These remarks were broadly denounced, but clearly attest to the anti-foreigner 
sentiments that the Prince sometimes panders to. 
Whereas the Prince plays a very active role in Liechtenstein politics, and ‘is 
unrepentant about causing controversy with speeches’,78 both his predecessor and heir 
appear to have a more diplomatic and modest ruling style. In 2004, the reigning 
Prince indicated that he would leave the day-to-day management of the country in the 
hands of his son, the hereditary Prince Alois, who is regarded as less confrontational. 
This observation is in line with our broader supposition that personal leadership 
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makes a difference in small states, and to a large degree determines the course of 
small state politics. While the constitutional position of the Prince in the Liechtenstein 
system is unlikely to change, a passing of royal power strongly affects the practical 
authority of the monarchy vis-à-vis the other institutions in the political system of the 
Principality.  
 
Conclusion:  the king’s dilemma in small states 
In all three of our cases, a composite and fluctuating combination between 
representative democracy and monarchical rule can be observed.  In two of our cases 
– Bhutan and Tonga – monarchical rulers have sought to appease liberal and 
progressive elements of society by absorbing them into the ruling regime.79 In doing 
so they have retained their authority and provided an avenue or outlet for progressive 
politics. This strategy, Huntington argues, delays rather than resolves the King’s 
Dilemma and as such is ultimately doomed to fail. In time, he maintains, progressive 
elements will undermine the legitimacy of the traditional order on which the authority 
of the monarch is based, leading to political change. Certainly, Huntington concedes 
that placating liberal elements is both necessary and effective in the early phases of 
modernisation. In Liechtenstein, however, the ruling Prince has recently sought to 
extend his authority by successfully exerting a power play against elected politicians, 
whom he refers to as “the oligarchy”. By using populist tactics, the Prince has in fact 
confronted and to some extent overmatched the liberal elements in Liechtenstein 
society. As this particular case shows, the supposedly linear pathway from 
“traditional” to “modern” forms of political authority rests on two questionable 
assumptions – that there is only one path to modernity and that all states must 
eventually follow it – and so we conclude by unpacking these assumptions and 
considering their implication for theories of democratic transition and consolidation.   
  While Huntington’s King’ Dilemma is a useful analytic device for unpacking 
the types of choices that today’s monarchs face, our cases also appear to highlight its 
limitations, with reformers in all our three countries resolute in their belief that the 
monarchy retains a central role in modern society. In Tonga the monarch retains 
considerable formal powers and popular support. If anything, it is the role of the 
nobility that has been undermined by recent reforms. Similarly, in Bhutan the 
monarch enjoys the support and confidence of the people. Although the Constitution 
has reduced the absolute powers of the monarch, it continues to wield considerable 
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nominal power because of its popularity. In Liechtenstein, monarchy and (direct) 
democracy are the twin pillars of the political system. Despite considerable domestic 
and international opposition, the 2003 reforms have bolstered the position of the 
monarchy at the expense of representative institutions and direct democracy. As a 
result, we argue, Liechtenstein has joined Monaco as the least democratic country in 
Western Europe. A broader analysis of all remaining monarchies is required to 
definitively disprove Huntington’s hypothesis but for now our aims are both more 
modest and fundamental: to explore the resilience of monarchs in three small states 
and so consider what their experience can reveal about existing theories and patterns 
of democratization. The lesson is that the size of political units is a critical variable 
too often overlooked in existing studies.  
Like most of the world’s last remaining monarchies, our three cases have 
populations of less than 1.5 million people. Their experience supports Paul Sutton’s 
view that small states are more likely to retain institutional fidelity than large states.80 
In all three of our cases the monarchy is strongly linked to the existence and 
international sovereignty of the state, and in all three cases this notion appears to have 
bolstered the position of the monarchy vis-à-vis potential republican elements. In 
contrast to Huntington, and paradoxically from the perspective of democratization 
theory, to various extents the inhabitants of the three small states appear happy to 
relinquish some of their democratic rights to powerful monarchs. In addition to the 
prevalence of conservatism, part of the reason for this, we argue, is the 
personalisation of politics in these contexts. In all three cases the monarchs in 
question were not just symbolically popular, they were also personally popular. That 
is not to say that monarchs in large states cannot achieve personal popularity – quite 
the opposite – but rather that the significance of personalisation is magnified in small 
states due to the close proximity between the ruler and the ruled. The result is that 
monarchs are not remote or distant figures, thus undermining the potential for the 
regime to become a symbol of oppression.    
In sum, while Huntington’s “King’s Dilemma” offers a useful analytic device 
that can help us understand the types of choices that monarchs are confronted with in 
the modern world, his prediction that monarchs must eventually disappear struggles to 
explain recent events in Liechtenstein, Tonga or Bhutan. Indeed, all three examples 
illustrate how both monarchy and democracy can be resilient and adaptive forms of 
political organisation. To be sure, this phenomenon may be isolated to small states. 
20 
 
But given that this group of countries are paradoxically both more democratic and 
more monarchical than large states, their experience is of considerably greater 
intellectual importance than the marginal position they currently occupy in 
comparative political science. By studying monarchy in small states we learn 
something important about large states, too. 
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